The Michigan Court of appeals held that the Michigan statute which renders no-contest provisions in wills unenforceable reflects public policy that no- contest clauses in trust agreements are also unenforceable, if there is probable cause for challenging the trust. As applied in a trust contest case, a trust that failed to include a provision for the distribution of the trust corpus after the death of grantor's dogs or grantor's grandson violated the rule against perpetuities on its face in that it was not certain to vest or terminate within 21 years after grantor's death or within 90 years after the creation of the trust. Therefore, there was a substantial likelihood that the grandson's challenge to the trust as violating the rule against perpetuities would be successful so that the no-contest provision in the trust was unenforceable against the grandson. In re Mary E. Griffin Revocable Grantor Trust, (Mich.App.)
The former trustee of a terminated trustee had right under the Probate Code to an equitable lien on the distributed trust assets in order to compensate attorneys involved in completing and defending an accounting of the trust. The probate court had terminated the trust and distributed its assets, but later ordered the trust beneficiaries to return a portion of the trust to provide a fund from which to pay the trustee's attorney fees and costs in completing and defending the accounting. The court had authority to impose an equitable lien on the distributed trust assets under the section of the Probate Code which authorizes such a lien in connection with advances made for the protection of the trust and for expenses, losses, and liabilities sustained in the administration of the trust. As the trust assets had been distributed, that section allowed the court to impose an equitable lien to pay trustee expenses. The issue was one of first impression. Kasperbauer v. Fairfield,(Cal.App. 2 Dist
The invalidation of a will that left the testator's entire estate to only one of her five daughters was not warranted in the absence of evidence that the daughter, who was the will beneficiary, exerted any influence on the testator in the making of the will. Although she drove the testator to her attorney's office and was present when the will was executed, there was no evidence that she had any involvement in the decision to create the will or any input into its contents. Given the absence of evidence that the daughter attempted to exert any influence specifically with respect to the will, the fact that the testator might have been in a fragile emotional state at the time of the will's execution was of little relevance. Lipscomb v. Young,(Ga.)
The amounts set forth in a daughter's final accounting as the guardian of her incapacitated mother, who later died, were inaccurate and incomplete, in proceedings for the accounting of all funds received and expended by the daughter as guardian and to discover property of the mother's estate withheld by the daughter. The mother's successor guardian detailed a number of substantial assets that were not contained in the daughter's final accounting. The daughter's trial testimony confirmed the existence of many of these assets. These included a certificate of deposit and two bank accounts totaling approximately $430,000 and an annuity contract from which the daughter withdrew approximately $56,000 and from which she was ultimately paid approximately $300,000 after representing falsely that she was her mother's only surviving child. In re Campione,(N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.)
A decedent's bequest of the contents of a brokerage account identified by its account number and brokerage firm, which the decedent described as the "Municipal Bond fund which represents 95% of the entire account valued at $340,000," as well as the "Cash and mutual funds," did not adeem by extinction, even though the decedent subsequently arranged an "in-kind" transfer of all the contents of the account to another brokerage firm which assigned a new account number. Notably, the contents of the new account were the same as the contents of the old account. Therefore, the appellate court found that there was no change in the substance or essential nature of the property, and the real nature and identity of the thing given had been substantially preserved. This decision may not yet be released for publication. In re Estate of Geary,(Tenn.Ct.App.)